Introduction
Since China joined the WTO in 2001, it has been involved in many WTO dispute settlement proceedings.1 By far the larger portion of these disputes have taken place during the second half of this ten year period.2
While most cases against China have involved a variety of regulatory barriers, as a complainant China thus far has used the WTO dispute settlement system primarily to challenge various trade defence instrument (TDI) measures imposed against it by the US and EU.
This contribution focuses on two such cases. In the first, United States -Definitive Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China,3 China challenged, among others, the imposition of concurrent anti-dumping and countervailing duties by the United States. There is plenty of precedent for dual-track trade remedies cases, but the main issue raised in this case relates directly to the provision in China's Protocol of Accession which provides for the use of an NME methodology in anti-dumping cases. In EC -Fasteners,4 China challenged, among others, the so-called individual treatment (IT) provision of the EU-whereby the EU applies "country wide" duties to companies not passing the "IT test"-both as such (on its face) and as applied in the anti-dumping investigation into steel fasteners. As was the case in US -AD and CVD with respect to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the AB found for China on the basis of the violation of a provision which existed before its accession to the WTO, yet at the root of the dispute was how those provisions might be read in light of China's status as an NME, as purportedly enshrined in its Protocol of Accession. was based on the view that, given the highly distortionary nature of the role played by the governments of centrally-planned economies with no discernible private sector, it would not be appropriate to apply the countervailing duty legislation NMEs because a "non-market economy would in effect be subsidizing [itself] ."7 The USDOC reconciled the Georgetown Steel case-which the Supreme Court did not hear and remains "good law" in the United States to this day-with its decision to apply CVDs against China by distinguishing the "Soviet-style economies of the 1980s," which were the subject of the Georgetown Steel case,8 from present-day China. The USDOC considered that, while China should remain "an NME for purposes of the US anti-dumping law"9 in light of the continued perceived distortion in China's domestic sale prices and costs and thus their inability to produce reliable "normal values," China's economy had nevertheless changed in fundamental ways such that it was no longer considered to resemble the "traditional Soviet-style command economy" that was the subject of the Georgetown Steel case.
Apart from the issue of whether, given its NME status in the anti-dumping context, the USDOC could apply its CVD legislation to China in any manner, the USDOC's change of course on China raised two other broad sets of problems that would go on to be the focus of the eventual WTO dispute. The first is what is commonly termed the double remedy issue, where double remedies are considered to occur in situations in which the concurrent imposition of CVD and anti-dumping duties (ADD) has the effect of twice offsetting the same instances of subsidization.
